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Appellee's Brief greatly misconstrues the discretion of Utah District Courts to grant
defaults in cases of inability to comply with scheduling orders, gravely misstates the facts
shown by the record in this case, and would simply ignore an obvious denial of
constitutional due process. In the course of doing so, the brief neglects to contest that the
claim of prejudice to appellee on which the default in this case was based, was simply false,
or that any such prejudice was readily avoidable by appellee. In sum, appellee's Brief fails
to provide a defense for a default judgment which, on its face, was precipitate and
unsupported by the record.

THE DISTRICT COURT MUST FIND. ON AN ADEQUATE RECORD. THAT ANY
NON-COMPLIANCE WAS VOLUNTARY
Appellee disputes appellant's assertion of law that default is not an appropriate
sanction for non-compliance with a scheduling order unless the court finds that the noncompliance was willful or intentional. Appellee cites Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997), which asserts that the court "must find . . . willfulness, bad
faith or fault . . . or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process". Thus
appellee says, for example, that the court need not find the non-compliance intentional or
in "bad faith"; it may simply find it "willful". To demonstrate the distinction, appellee asserts
that " . . . to be considered 'willful', Defendant's conduct need only be 'any intentional
failure as distinguished from involuntary non-compliance'...." citing Tuck v. Godfrey, 981
P.2d 407 (U. App. 1999).
This circularity demonstrates no significant distinction.
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Behavior which is not

voluntary - "intentional", "willful", in "bad faith or fault", "persistent dilatory tactics" - is not
subject to sanctions. There are no cases which suggest that the sanction of default is
sustainable where defendant is prevented against his will from fully complying.1
Apparently, appellee takes the fact that District Courts have "primary" responsibility
with regard to sanctions, and that their decisions in this regard are reviewed for abuse of
discretion, to mean that the District Courts have "wide latitude" in these matters. In fact,
the Utah cases are uniform that any such discretion is narrowly circumscribed, and will not
be sustained in the absence of a record which supports the sanction chosen. Morton v.
Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997); Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schlatter,
768 P.2d 950, 961 (U. Apps. 1989); Hales v. Oldrovd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (U. App. 2000);
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964). The inescapable fact in the
present case is that while the District Court entered Findings and Conclusions, it did not
make a record from which it could be determined that its discretion may have been properly
exercised.
Appellee simply ignores this part of the rule: the court must make specific findings,

1

A footnote in Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 852 P.2d 4, 7 (n.2) (Utah
1993), suggests that the Supreme Court once sustained a default (in W.W. & W.B.
Gardiner, Inc., v. Park West Village, Inc.. 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1997) "without a
showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault" where the court found "persistent dilatory
tactics frustrating the judicial process". In Gardiner, however, the Court did not
distinguish between "willfulness" and "bad faith", and required "frustration of the judicial
process" which "impedes trial on the merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether
the allegations . . . have any factual merit." 568 P.2d at 738. Respectfully, it confounds
the ordinary meaning of the words to suggest that "persistent dilatory tactics" can be
committed involuntarily, or that refusal to prove one's allegations can be other than in
"bad faith". In any case, there is nothing like a finding of frustration of the judicial
process by defendants in the present case.
3

upon sufficient evidence, that the non-compliance was willful The Court "must find . . .
willfulness . .. etc.", Morton, supra, 938 P.2d at 204. A "court may impose sanctions under
Rule 37 only after the court finds 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory
tactics frustrating the judicial process". Tuck v. Godfrey, supra, 981 P.2d at 411. "Before
imposing sanctions, the court must find . . . willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent
dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process". Hales v. Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (U.
App. 2000). Appellee does not pretend that the District Court, despite having made
findings and conclusions, made any finding that any non-compliance in this case was
voluntary. It did not. The entire basis for the ruling below is simply that some noncompliance occurred, which appellee claimed was "prejudicial".
Instead, appellee argues that a partisan reading of select facts, ignoring proffered
evidence that any non-compliance was involuntary, could now produce a conclusion of
"willfulness", etc. In support of ignoring the offer to prove that any non-compliance was
involuntary, appellee asserts for the first time that "Defendants have produced an array of
extra-record unauthenticated hearsay documents, most of which are in Dutch . . . ."
The documents (Exhibits "A", "D", Brief of Appellants, R. 305-328) are not "extra
record". They were part of a proffer to the District Court on appellant's Motion for
Reconsideration. The District Court was advised that the documentation was produced in
haste, and was only partially translated, but would be promptly translated to permit full
reconsideration. The documents, as explained to the Court, contain a collection of official
Dutch court documents, properly endorsed, setting out the course and dates of the
prosecution which had prevented timely compliance. These documents are regular on their
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face and could hardly be fakes. In any case, they included the translated statement of
Dutch counsel, Mr. Starmanns, vouching for the accuracy of the general representations.
The documents are generally ones which, unless objected to, may be treated as selfauthenticating.

U.R. Ev. Rule 902 (3), (6). The Court will recall, moreover, that

"representations of counsel" was the evidentiary standard upon which the District Court had
based the default.
In response to submission of these documents to the District Court, appellee raised
none of the objections it raises now, and, thus, waived them. See Exhibit "E", Brief of
Appellants, UP & L's Response to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, R. 332-337.
Appellee's Response appears to treat the documents and the statements about them as true,
but like the District Court's "Ruling" which followed it, treats the issue of whether any noncompliance was voluntary as irrelevant. Appellee took the position, and the District Court
adopted it, that all that mattered was that some non-compliance had occurred, and some
"prejudice" was alleged.
The documents and statements proffered without objection were sufficient to raise
the issue of voluntariness of any non-compliance. The District Court could readily have
reserved judgment pending a hearing and full translation and authentication of the
documents. It simply declined to consider the issue of voluntariness. The documents were
accompanied by a summary of the appraisal for which an extension had been granted
previously, showing both that a genuine issue of valuation existed and that the appraisal
could be completed very shortly. The submission was sufficient to show that a genuine
constitutional issue existed whether any sanction was appropriate, that any delay resulting
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from any non-compliance was likely to be de minimis, and that a default on its face denied
constitutionally required due process.

The District Court's response, at appellee's

prompting, amounted to simple refusal to consider such matters.
The rule applied in Utah is that an abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions will be
found where the District Court fails to provide an evidentiary record supporting its action.
The District Court must find, based upon sufficient evidence, that any non-compliance was
at least voluntary. E.g., Morton, supra, 938 P.2d at 274, 276; Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d
646, 649 (U. Apps. 1997). While the District Court here entered the Findings and
Conclusions proffered by plaintiff, it made no effort to determine whether any noncompliance was voluntary, or the sanction was app opriate, and its conclusion that prejudice
had resulted to plaintiff was not based upon competent evidence, and was demonstrably
false.
While appellee attempts to inflate the evidence available to show wrongdoing on the
part of defendants, what the record in fact shows is that initial delay was excused because
the court recognized that it was involuntary, but that when the same difficulties were
repeated, causing a second delay, the court declined to consider the reason. The record
further shows that the "prejudice" which appellee alleged, and which was the only colorable
basis given for the ruling, was always readily avoidable by appellee, and, in fact, never
occurred.
While appellee now asserts that the evidence considered by the District Court might
have sustained a finding of "willfulness" by defendants had the District Court cared to make
one, the fact is that the District Court did not make one, and could not properly have done
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so without considering defendants' evidence. Had the District Court considered the
evidence proffered by defendants, it could not properly have drawn any conclusion except
that any non-compliance was involuntary.
The District Court's record is wholly inadequate to sustain its ruling.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF "FRUSTRATION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS"
Appellee's reconstruction of the facts of this case ("From April 8, 1999, to April 11,
2000, Defendants did nothing to advance this litigation, and specifically, did not produce an
appraisal that would contradict the $196,070.00 appraisal previously submitted by
PacifiCorp."), is almost farcical. There was no "$196,070.00 appraisal previously submitted
by PacifiCorp." There was a poorly supported "affidavit" of Bryce Clinger, which did not
constitute an appraisal. See Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45. Following April 8, 1999, there
was a Request for Continuance, which was granted, and a Motion for Leave to Withdraw,
also granted. Counsel subsequently re-appeared. There was then entered a Pretrial
Scheduling Order. Counsel then felt compelled to withdraw again, but shortly before the
scheduled conference on April 11, 2000, notified the District Court and counsel that he
would re-appear. The default was precipitated by counsel's tardiness, without fault, in
appearing at the pretrial conference.
There is no evidence of "repeated failure" to comply with scheduling orders. There
is a single non-compliance.

There is no evidence that, except during periods of

incarceration and occupation in a Dutch criminal prosecution, defendants were in any
degree dilatory in completing an appraisal. Indeed, the evidence shows that the complex
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and lengthy appraisal had been virtually completed by April 11, 2000, and required only a
short further extension.
There was submitted with appellants' Motion for Reconsideration a summary of Mr.
Chudleigh's nearly completed appraisal. While the document is merely a summary, it has
at least the status of the "Affidavit of Biyce A. dinger" (Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45)
submitted by PacifiCorp in order to obtain an Order of Immediate Occupancy. Certainly,
its conclusion that $1,182,000.00 was due contradicts Mr. dinger's earlier thumbnail
estimate of $196,070.00 and states at least equally appropriate support for the conclusions.
It is apparent on the face of the document that it could not have been produced overnight,
but resulted from substantial amounts of work following the prior scheduling conference,
during the periods in which appellant's representative was not subjected to prosecution in
Holland. In any case, counsel for appellee was so informed shortly before the scheduling
conference on April 11, 2000, and agreed that a further short extension of the schedule was
in order.
Nothing prevented such a further short extension of the schedule except the fact that
defendant's counsel was unavoidably delayed on the morning of April 11, 2000. No one
pretends that if counsel had not been delayed on April 11, 2000, a default would have been
entered. The purpose of the conference April 11, 2000, was to schedule trial and related
matters. There is literally nothing in the record to show that any trial date the District
Court could have assigned would not have permitted time to complete the appraisal and any
necessary discovery or motions related to it.
Accordingly, there is no evidence of any kind of "frustration of the judicial process."
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It is entirely possible that precisely the same judicial process would have occurred had
counsel not been tardy on April 11, 2000, as could have occurred notwithstanding the
tardiness.
The only reason suggested below why the delay defendants had required to complete
the matter was in any degree prejudicial was that, pending a determination of the right to
take, the local authority, Wasatch County, declined to issue building permits. Plaintiff had
an order of immediate occupancy. It could have commenced construction at any time,
except that it could not obtain permits. It could not obtain permits because, as part of the
extensive planning and approval of defendant's land for a resort/recreational development
of importance to the County, plaintiff had contracted in writing to put its substation
elsewhere. The County enforced its interest in this promise by declining permits while the
issue of plaintiffs right to violate its agreement remained pending.
Further, plaintiff does not contest that it could have brought the issue of its
obligation to locate the substation elsewhere to a decision on motion at any time, avoiding
any delay due to defendant's need for further time to prove value. Plaintiff did not so
proceed either because it feared the result, or feared that, if it prevailed and built the
substation, it would subsequently be shown to have caused greater damage than it wished
to compensate. It is disingenuous to suggest that defendant deterred plaintiff by delaying
revelation of defendant's appraisal: condemnors who obtain orders of immediate occupancy
rely, as a matter of statute, on the integrity and accuracy of their own "appraisals".
The default entered in this case simply avoids a fair resolution of the issues: plaintiff
gets the land for a pittance, and avoids its contract not to take the land. As demonstrating
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the urgent need, in April, 2000, to do this, plaintiff has never taken any step to utilize the
property taken in any way, and remains engaged in negotiations to acquire other sites for
the substation.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FAULT ON THIS RECORD
Appellee suggests that appellant's counsel has confessed fault in this case in order
to relieve appellants of a finding of fault. In fact, counsel has simply pointed out that the
event precipitating the default in this case was only counsel's inability, without fault, to
appear on time. Otherwise, it is plain that appellants had properly sought and been granted
additional time previously, and appellee does not dispute that, had appellant's counsel been
able to be timely, appellee would not have objected, on April 11, 2000, to the further short
extension necessary to complete the appraisal. The only prejudice to appellee asserted in
this matter is that while a claim was pending that appellee had contracted away power to
take the site in question, Wasatch County would not give appellee building permits to
activate its order of immediate occupancy.
Respecting the claim of prejudice, at least all of the following should be re-asserted:
1.

Appellants could not be at fault for maintaining a proper defense, or for the

County's refusal of building permits, in light of such defense;
2.

The matter did not "frustrate the judicial process", because appellee could

have tested that defense by motion at any time, and;
3.

There is no reason to believe that even if the District Court had scheduled

trial the morning of April 11, 2000, a trial date could have been provided which did

10

not incorporate the brief extension appellants needed to complete the appraisal
In short, there is neither evidence of fault or a frustration of the judicial process by
appellants on the District Court's record.
Peculiarly, appellee asserts (Brief at pg. 9) that a default would not have been in
order had Mr. Bogerd, once free of the Dutch prosecution, "gotten a message to his counsel
to move for a stay of proceedings." In fact, that is very nearly what occurred.
The record fairly shows that work on the subject appraisal continued expeditiously
into early 2000. Meanwhile, in late December 1999, Mr. Bogerd was summoned to appear
in the Dutch criminal action. Whether appellee chooses now - without specific evidence to disbelieve it, the effect of such a summons, as reported to counsel, is to prevent leaving
the immediate vicinity and to limit any communications regarding the prosecution to counsel
appearing in the prosecution. It makes little difference, therefore, that Mr. Bogerd was not
actually incarcerated for the whole period of December, 1999 to April 2000 when the
prosecution ended, or that American counsel was able on some occasions to contact Mr.
Bogerd's staff. Mr. Bogerd was not permitted to leave, or to explain his situation to
American counsel or the court. Finally, freed of this restraint in early April, 2000, Mr.
Bogerd called counsel and sought an extension.
More importantly, upon being informed of the circumstances, counsel for appellee
agreed not to oppose a request for such an extension at the pretrial conference April 11,
2000. Had counsel for appellants not been unavoidably detained the morning of April 11,
2000, it seems entirely likely that an appropriate extension would have been sought and
granted.
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In short, the determinant factor in changing the extension which could and should
have happened the morning of April 11, 2000, into a default, was not that Mr. Bogerd did
not call to seek an extension earlier than he did, but that counsel had an unfortunate drug
reaction and was late on April 11.

EFFECTIVE, LESSER SANCTIONS WERE READILY AVAILABLE
Further, appellee suggests that it is not the duty of Utah District Courts to canvass
lesser sanctions before resorting to default, despite statements like that in Tucker Realty,
Inc. v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964):
We recognize that the granting of a judgment against a party solely for
disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent
measure which should be employed with caution and restraint and only where
the failure has been willful and the interests of justice so demand. Except in
very aggravated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could be applied to
accomplish the desired result, particularly where there is any likelihood of
injustice by depriving a party of a meritorious cause of action or defense.
Whether the failure to comply with the court's order is willful and whether
the circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the action taken is primarily
for the trial court to determine. Unless it is shown that his action is without
support in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be
disturbed.
396 P.2d at 412 (citations omitted).
Nothing here suggests that what is "primarily" the responsibility of the District Court
is not subject to review. Certainly, there is nothing in this statement which suggests that a
judgment of default will be left undisturbed which wholly fails to consider "whether the
failure to comply with the court's order is willful and whether the circumstances are so
aggravated as to justify the action taken." Where, in a case of default, it is obvious on the
face of the record that lesser sanctions which fully disposed of any claim of prejudice were
12

readily available, and were ignored by the District Court, and the court declines
consideration of evidence non-compliance was involuntary, it is plain without more that the
"action is without support in the record."

THE DEFAULT PLAINLY DENIES CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED DUE
PROCESS
Appellant suggests that Utah Department of Transportation v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d
4 (Utah 1995) demonstrates the appropriateness of the default in this condemnation case.
The opposite is true.
Not only are the facts in Osguthorpe regarding non-compliance (with repeated
discovery orders) vastly different, the District Court there made specific findings of
willfulness (quoted 892 P.2d at 6), and the case states a flat constitutional requirement of
opportunity to be heard on just compensation: "In an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, due process requires that the owners be given an opportunity to be heard on the
issue of compensation . . . The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and when this opportunity
is granted a complainant, who chooses not to exercise it, that complainant cannot later
plead a denial of procedural due process." 892 P.2d at 6-7. There "The default [entered
December, 1993] provided for an evidentiary hearing to determine the compensation to be
paid. A notice of hearing was served on Osguthorpe . .. [which] advised him that a hearing
would be held on January 10, 1994, at which time evidence would be received relative to
the compensation to be paid . . . Osguthorpe failed to respond and did not appear at the
hearing." Id- at 5.
13

The effect of the default in the present case is to deny any meaningful opportunity
to be heard. While condemnors present an "appraisal of value" at the time of obtaining an
order of immediate occupancy (see Section 78-34-9, U.C.A. (1953)), courts accept (and in
this case accepted) minimal "affidavits" without supporting analysis or documentation, no
hearing on value is held at that time, and no final decision is made. Both the right to
condemn and the compensation due remain in issue pending further hearings. Id.; Utah
State Rd. Common v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana
Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 255 Pac. 672 (Utah 1926). The "affidavit" regarding a
"preliminary analysis" presented by appellee at that time (see Exhibit "A" hereto, R. 39-45)
excluded, without explanation, severance damage, the bulk of contested compensation in this
case. The only meaningful opportunity to be heard on compensation in this case was the
further statutory hearing (see Section 78-34-10, U.C.A. (1953)) which never occurred.
The default in the present case, did not "provide for an evidentiary hearing to
determine compensation to be paid", as in Osguthorpe. Further, of course, inability to
complete an appraisal as scheduled, absent any consideration of whether the failure was
voluntary, cannot be regarded as a choice to forego an opportunity to be heard.2 The
record here shows denial of opportunity to be heard; the District Court declined to consider
whether loss of the constitutionally required opportunity was voluntary.

2

Appellee suggests that Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984) supports the
default entered in the present case. Larsen involved a motion to set aside a default
under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., and specifically found that as the District Court correctly
found defendants' non-compliance voluntary, defendant had failed to show "excusable
mistake, inadvertence or neglect." Here the District Court declined to consider
compelling evidence that any non-compliance was involuntary, and therefore, cannot
show any knowing waiver of the constitutional right to a meaningful hearing.
14

All of the same considerations apply to denial of hearing on the issue of whether
appellee contracted away the right to select the site condemned. While the defendant in
Osguthorpe had waived the right to contest the power to take, appellants here have
preserved it. The default denies hearing on that as well.
Under Osguthorpe, absent evidence or a determination below that any noncompliance by appellants was willful and amounted to knowing rejection of a right to be
heard, the default in the present case is a blank denial of due process.

THE RULING CONTAINS AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW
Appellee is correct, of course, that a default will be overturned where the record
below does not support it, or where it incorporates an incorrect conclusion of law. See
Hales, supra, 999 P.2d at 588; Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 646, 649 (U. Apps. 1997).
Appellee is simply wrong that the District Court's Ruling does not incorporate an erroneous
conclusion of law.
The first of the District Court's "Conclusions of Law" is an unsupported, and
erroneous, finding of fact. The second is also a finding of fact. The third is inartfully
stated, but necessarily concludes that mere non-compliance with a scheduling order, even
if involuntary, coupled with an unsupported claim of prejudice to plaintiff, is a sufficient
basis for a default, and notwithstanding defendant is thereby denied due process in the form
of a meaningful hearing on compensation. The conclusion that appellee was entitled to a
default in the circumstances related was entirely erroneous. Obviously, the "Ruling" is based
upon an incorrect conclusion of law. It is also true that the record does not support the
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ruling, but that effect is due to the failure of the District Court to establish and comply with
a correct legal standard.

CONCLUSIONS
The District Court threatened a default in this matter if defendants were not
represented by counsel as necessary following November 26, 1999. The morning of April
11, 2000, it appears that the Clerk of the Court neglected to advise the District Judge that
counsel would re-appear, but had been unavoidably delayed. As it thus appeared that the
conditions for entry of a default were met, the Court entered one. The matter has since
evolved into a refusal of the District Court to acknowledge that the impression obtained
April 11, 2000, was erroneous, and that no other basis for imposing a default existed.
The effort to construct a basis for default after the fact in this case cannot succeed.
Defendants' behavior until April 11, 2000, was in compliance with the District Court's
scheduling orders as properly extended. The non-compliance on the morning of April 11,
2000, is not shown to have frustrated the judicial process in any degree, nor to have
prejudiced plaintiff in any way not readily avoidably by plaintiff. Most of all, any noncompliance was wholly involuntary: defendants were prevented by the imposition of criminal
process elsewhere from fully complying with the Court's schedule.
The District Court wholly failed to consider these matters. It is not adequate now
to claim that had it done so, it is possible that a similar resolution could have been reached.
It failed to do so, as a consequence of which the District Court's order not only incorporates
an erroneous conclusion of law, but is wholly unsupported by the record. No conclusion can
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be drawn that a default is appropriate in this case absent consideration of matters the
District Court declines to acknowledge. The default herein should he vacated and this
matter re-instated.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12th day of March, 2002.

E. Craig Sma^
Attorney for Appell;
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
"APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 13th day of March,
2002 to the following:
Tony Rampton
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook, & McDonough
170 So. Main #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034
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Tab A

EXHIBIT "A"

Anthony L. Rampton, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Post Office Box 45561
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561
Telephone: (801)531-7090
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation,
dba Utah Power, successor in interest
by merger of Utah Power and Light
Company, a Utah corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BRYCE A. CLINGER

Plaintiff,
vs.
STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS, an entity
formed under the laws of The Netherlands;
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS, an entity formed under the laws
of The Netherlands; and JORDAN
INVESTMENTS, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Civil No.: 980500241
Judge:

Defendants.

BRYCE A. CLINGER, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states:
1.

I am a Certified General Appraiser licensed by the state of Utah. I am a

Member of Appraisal Institute No. 6576.
Exhibit A.

My qualifications are attached hereto as

2.

I have substantial experience in appraising properties in the vicinity of the

Jordanelle Reservoir having, among other things, acted as appraiser for the Bureau of
Reclamation with respect to its condemnation of properties for purposes of constructing
the Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir.
3.

I have been asked by Utah Power to perform an appraisal of the easements

(transmission line) and fee simple (Jordanelle Substation) being condemned by Utah
Power in this action including those properties presently owned by Stichting Mayflower
and related entities.
4.

In performing this appraisal, I have determined the market value of the

subject properties utilizing the comparable sales approach to valuation, as well as an
analysis of proposed development. For these purposes, "market value" is defined as the
most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and the seller each acting prudently
and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
5.

Using this method of valuation, I have determined that the total value of

the easements and fee simple being condemned on Stichting Mayflower properties as of
the date of the filing of the Complaint is $196,070. See Exhibit B attached hereto.
6.

It is also my opinion that there will be no severance damage accruing to

the portions of Stichting Mayflower property not sought to be condemned.

?

DATED this

day of September. 1998.

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATEOFUTAH
*"7i ' i-

CATOLDELBfli:
pryce
391 SoulhOnnp*«<,a*CI

_ j - ^ u *-?-£*'*

A. Clinger

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 7_

day of Septem

1998.

sl/A^£

Notary Public
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EXHIBIT "A"

42-

Qualifications for Bryce A. Clinger, M A I
Certified General Appraiser- State of Utah
C G 000 36986. Expiration- C 30-99

Continuing Education Seminars — past 7 years only:
Sep 1991

Course 403 Easement Valuation
International Right of Way Assoc.

Oct 1991

The Appraiser As An Expert Witness

Professional Affiliation:
Member of Appraisal Institute. No 667G
Collage Education:
BS University Studies
University Studies — Accounting/Finance
Brigham Young Unrversity, 1974
Experience:
1QH1 - Now

1976 - 1981

Appraiser and Consultant
Self-employed
Appraiser, associated with
Zane D. Bergeson. MAI
Salt Lake City, Utah

1978 - 1981

Appraiser and Development Manager
Beneficial Development Co.
Salt Lake City, Utah

1974 - 1976

Appraiser, Utah Dcpai (merit of
Transportation
Salt Lake City. Utah

1973 - 1974

(AIREA)
Feb 1992

Reviewing Appraisals (Al)

Sep 1992

Subdivision Analysis (SREA)

Oct 1993

Appraising From Bluepnnts and
Specifications (Al)
Feasibility Analysis and Highest
and Best Use (Al)

Apr 1994

Jul 1994

Maximizing the "Value" of an
Appraisal Practice (Al)

Jul 1994

Current Issues &. Misconceptions
In the Appidisdl Pmcess (Al)

Sep 1994

Understanding Limited Appraisals
and Reporting Options (Al)

May 1996

Geological Concerns in Real
Estate (UT. Chapter. Al)

May 1998

Commercial Heating, Ventilation,
and Air Conditioning Systems
(UT. Chapter, Al)

Sep 1995

Appraisal Review - Income
Properties (Al)

Sep 1996

Advanced Techniques in

Appraiser. Zions First National Bank
Provo, Utah

A d v a n c e d Appraisal Course Study:
Society of Real Estate Appraisers
"An Introduction to Appraising Real Property"
Salt Lake City. Utah. 1974
Society of Real Estate Appraisers
"Principles of Income Property Appraising"
University of Utah. 1975
American Society of F«« m Managers & Rural Appraisers
Eminent Domain School
Salt Lake City. Utah. 1976
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers
"Urban Properties"
Bloomlngton. Indiana, 1 9 / 6
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers
"Introduction to Investment Analysis"
Boulder, Colorado, 1980
Appraisal Institute
"Standards of Professional Practice Parts A & B
Botee, Idaho 1992

Investment Feasibility (Al)
Rep 1997

New Industrial Valuation (Al)

Nov 1997

Data Confirmation & Venfication
Methods (Al)
Valuation of Contaminated Properties
Course 407 (IRWA)

Jul 1998

Bryce A. Clinger has completed the requirements
under the continuing education p r o g r a m of the
Appraisal Institute.
Types of Real Estate Appraised
Retail and Commercial Building3
Office Buildings
(ndustnal Properties
Agriculture Properties
Right of Way Valuation
Special Purpose Properties
Vacant land, various uses

EXHIBIT "B"

Bryce A. d i n g e r , MAI
Real Estate Appraiser and

Counselor

1031 North 250 East
Centerviile. UT 84014-1621
Phone/fax: (801)295-4523
March 1 1 , 1998

TO:

Claudia

Conder,

REF.: — Mayflower

Utah

Power

Ownerships,

138kVpowerline

My preliminary analysis of this appraisal problem shows the following
conclusions:
THE NORTH PARCEL -- 1,050 acres total ownership
Parcel No. 3 (Richardson Flat)
0.97 acres @ $5,000 per a c x 60% of fee

$ 2,910

Parcel No. 5 (Hillside above the old RR R/W)
3.24 acres @ $5,000 per ac x 60% of fee

9,720

Parcel No. 8 (Span over Sage Hen Hollow)
0.58 acres @ $5,000 per ac x 60% of fee

1,740

Total for the North Parcel
THE SOUTH PARCEL - Master planned 1,400 acres
Parcel 11 (a) (Span over McHenry Canyon)
0.53 acres @ $30,000 per ac x 60% of fee

$ 14,370

$

9,540

Parcel 11 (b) (Hail Mtn. east slope)
5.12 acres @ $30,000 per ac x 60%

92,160

Substation site near the pedestrian underpass
2.0 acres @ $40,000 per acre

80,000

Total for the South Parcel
TOTAL FOR MAYFLOWER

3/11/98 MEMO

OWNERSHIPS

$181,700
$196,070
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